



SCHOOL SHOOTINGS:

HOW PREPARED ARE ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS?



COUNTY OF ORANGE

Grand Jury 2022-2023

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SUMMARY

The Center for Homeland Defense and Security, in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, maintains a K-12 school shooting data base. Some of their statistical findings are:

- There have been 2,069 school shooting incidents between 1970 and June 2022
- As a result of those shootings, 684 students and staff have died
- In the same time period, 1,937 students and staff were injured
- California, Texas, and Florida are the states with the most school shooting incidents.

The 2022-23 Grand Jury, during its investigation, interviewed members of law enforcement agencies on the subject of safety and security in our public schools. Almost everyone interviewed advised the Grand Jury that it is not a matter of IF an Orange County campus will be a victim of an active shooter incident, but WHEN one of our campuses will be a victim.

“You can’t wait to care until it happens to you”

*Mia Tretta-Los Angeles Times, 11/24/22
(Survivor of the 2019 Saugus High shooting)*

Orange County schools must be prepared and vigilant to do all that can be done to prevent another Nashville, Uvalde, Saugus, Parkland, Newtown, or Littleton school shooting from taking place here.

Based on its investigation, the Grand Jury believes that Orange County public school districts are doing a good job in attempting to maintain safe and secure campuses for their students. However, there is always room for improvement.

This investigative report makes recommendations for improvement in the following areas:

- Building and equipment infrastructure
- Training and training materials available for all personnel responsible for student safety and welfare
- Implementation of tabletop exercises throughout all Orange County school districts
- The need for more School Resource Officers (SROs)
- Increased coordination of responsibility between school staff and law enforcement
- Increase awareness and address mental health issues
- Increase fiscal commitments to implement identified school safety measures.



BACKGROUND

2017-18 ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY “SAFER SCHOOLS – WHAT CAN WE DO?” REPORT AND REPORT RESPONSE FOLLOW-UP

The 2017-18 Orange County Grand Jury issued a report titled **Safer Schools – What Can We Do?** Because school shootings continue to dominate the news and cause concern among students, faculty, staff, and parents, the 2022-23 Orange County Grand Jury decided to follow up on the 2017-18 Report responses as a part of its own investigation of school safety. The 2017-18 Report provides an important segue into the 2022-23 investigation of school safety.

Below is the *Summary*, *The Reason for the Study*, and a summary of the recommendations from the 2017-18 Grand Jury Report:

SUMMARY

“Breaking News --- Another school shooting has just occurred!

These words strike terror in the hearts of all parents as they pray that it has not occurred in their community. The frequency of violent events on school campuses across the nation is alarming. What are Orange County public school districts doing to minimize the threat of violence on campuses? Although Orange County public school districts are focused on minimizing the possibility of campus violence, there exists a considerable disparity between schools’ readiness in some districts compared to others. Whether it is fencing, visitor protocols, communication devices, or the use of identification badges, the main differentiating factor is each district’s access to funding sources for security measures. Schools in districts that have not passed school bond measures or have been unable to obtain grants have increasingly had to turn to local communities, including parents, for material support. Schools struggle to find both time and money to address competing priorities of improving academic achievement while preparing for the very real threat of school violence.

REASON FOR THE STUDY

School safety is a responsibility we all share. It is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent all violent events on campus, but schools are expected to provide a reasonably safe environment for both students and employees. School administrators have a critical responsibility to prepare for such events in order to protect the students and staff within the Orange County school system.

No one has all the answers, but through conversations and working together, solutions continue to evolve and improve. The primary purposes of this [2017-18] study are:

- To assess how well Orange County public schools are controlling access to campuses during school hours.*
- To provide school districts, boards, principals, and parents with information to improve preparation for violent school events.*
- To stimulate county-wide discussion identifying underutilized resources and to share problem-solving strategies.*
- To develop recommendations which can help school districts ensure schools implement their safe school programs.”*

RECOMMENDATIONS

The 2017-18 Grand Jury recommended that school districts should:

- explore all possible funding sources
- re-evaluate the lack of secure fencing on all school campuses
- maintain a complete daily log of every visitor and volunteer entering and exiting the campus
- require photo identification of all campus visitors and volunteers before a visitor's badge is issued
- require all faculty and staff to wear visible photo ID badges while on campus
- issue ID cards in a format to be worn as student ID badges while on campus
- issue two-way radios or equivalent communication devices enabling instant two-way communication with the office
- record, track, and report to the district office all campus incidents of unauthorized access
- perform a school security assessment to evaluate their current school safety plan.

2022-23 ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY FOLLOW UP

The 2022-2023 Grand Jury decided to follow up on School District Responses to the 2017-18 Grand Jury's recommendations as part of its own investigation into school safety. In their 2017-18 responses, 26 of the 28 public school Superintendents committed their District to further analysis and/or future action in response to Grand Jury Recommendations. The collective number of commitments made by the 26 districts was 88. In a September 2022 letter from the Orange County Grand Jury, the 26 Superintendents were reminded of their commitments and asked if their respective

districts had followed through on those commitments. The responses from the districts were gratifying. Multiple commitments had been fulfilled in response to each of the nine Recommendations included in the 2017-18 Grand Jury Report. Twenty districts that had committed to further analysis, and/or future action, reported having fulfilled all 69 of their commitments. Four districts reported having fulfilled 8 of their 13 commitments, with each district having fulfilled at least 50% of its commitments. Two districts, which had made three commitments each, responded stating that none of their commitments had been fulfilled.

Except for the two districts that failed to fulfill any of their six commitments, the 2022-2023 Grand Jury believes that students, faculty, staff, parents, District Boards of Education, and communities can be pleased with what their districts have accomplished in their efforts to improve School Safety in response to the Grand Jury 2017-18 Report.

While it is indisputable that much has been achieved during the past five years to make Orange County public schools safer, there is still much to be done. This new report includes recommendations that, if implemented, will make the schools even safer. While it is true that no school will ever be totally safe from intruders, it is the responsibility of school boards, school administrators, and law enforcement to make them as safe as possible.

REASON FOR STUDY

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) firearms are now the leading cause of death among children ages one through eighteen.

The Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), maintains a K-12 school shooting data base as part of their Homeland Security program. Some of the important statistical findings are as follows:

- There were 2,069 school shooting incidents between 1970 and June 2022
- For the above time frame, 684 students and staff died in shootings at schools
- 1,937 were injured
- California, Texas, and Florida were the states with the most incidents.

The Washington Post stated more than 338,000 students across the nation have experienced gun violence in their schools since 1999.

The 2022-2023 Grand Jury, based on its investigation, believes that Orange County public school districts are doing a good job in attempting to maintain a safe and secure campus for their students and school personnel/staff.

During almost every interview of the members of law enforcement, the Grand Jury learned that it is not a matter of *IF* an Orange County campus will be a victim of an active shooter but *WHEN* it will be a victim.

Therefore, the reason for this study by the 2022-2023 Grand Jury is to use all the information it learned through its method of study and provide recommendations to all the Orange County public schools on how they can make their schools safer for all their students, teachers, and staff while maintaining a quality campus learning environment.

Recommendations for improvement will be made in the following areas:

- Building and equipment infrastructure
- Training and training materials available for all personnel responsible for student safety and welfare
- Implementation of tabletop exercises throughout all Orange County school districts
- The need for more School Resource Officers (SROs)
- Increased coordination of responsibility between school staff and law enforcement
- Increased awareness of and address mental health issues
- Increased fiscal commitments to implement identified school safety measures.

METHOD OF STUDY

The Grand Jury accumulated the information for this report from the following sources:

- 2022-2023 Grand Jury School Safety Questionnaire for all public schools (41 questions) (See Appendix E)
- 2022-2023 follow-up on commitments made by Orange County school districts in response to the 2017-2018 Grand Jury report titled “Safer Schools-What Can We Do?” and the Recommendations contained in that published investigation
- Local/national news stories over several years and past Grand Jury reports in Orange County and other California counties
- Training videos of school violence prevention and casualty care
- School safety materials and procedures
- Public school district websites
- Comprehensive School Safety Plans of Orange County public schools
- Active shooter drills at several schools
- Tabletop exercises at several schools
- A Knowledge Saves Lives training session at a local public school
- The Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (OCIAC)
- Safety measures in place at several schools.

The Grand Jury interviewed:

- Principals from a number of Orange County elementary, middle, and high schools

- Representatives of Orange County school districts and other personnel responsible for school safety and risk management
- Orange County Sheriff's Department (OCSD) personnel including those responsible for public school safety
- Selected local city law enforcement personnel responsible for public school safety

INVESTIGATION & ANALYSIS

School Shootings Background

On May 24, 2022, television networks across the United States broadcast the horrific news that once again a mass shooting was taking place on an American school campus. The country watched in horror as a young man spent over seventy minutes brutally gunning down defenseless elementary school students after gaining entry to their school, Robb Elementary in Uvalde, Texas. When law enforcement eventually breached the door into a classroom, they shot and killed the assailant, but only after he had taken the lives of nineteen children and three adults. In addition, eighteen others were hospitalized with gun-shot wounds.

The sad reality is that this type of terrible incident is all too common in our nation. Teachers, school staff, and students have become very familiar with terms like “lockdown drills”, “shelter-in-place”, “Run, Hide, Fight”, “Distance, Evade, Engage”, and more. The many mass shootings have forced scores of individuals who entered the teaching profession to engage in soul-searching about their personal safety as well as that of their students. Many educators are faced with deciding whether to remain in the profession. How did we get to this sad situation?

“More than 338,000 students have experienced gun violence at school since Columbine through 366 school shootings since 1999.”
(Washington Post 4/17/23)

History shows us that Uvalde was not the first mass shooting in a school, and law enforcement officials tell us that it will not be the last. According to the 2022 *“Report on Indicators of School Crime and Safety 2021”* published by the Institutes of Educational Sciences in coordination with the U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of Justice, and others, “nonfatal victimization including theft, bullying and criminal victimization went down sixty percent between 2019-2020”. In contrast the report showed that “there were a total of 93 school shootings with casualties at public (and private) elementary and secondary schools in 2020-21—the highest number since 2000-01.”

According to the School-Associated Violent Death Surveillance System (SAVD-SS), “school shootings are defined as incidents in which a gun is brandished or fired on

school property or a bullet hits school property for any reason, regardless of the number of victims, time of day, day of the week or reason.” The SAVD-SS study showed that the year 2020-21 was the first time since this information was gathered that less than half of schools that had shootings were high schools. This is essential information that all school districts and their schools should consider when developing safety plans.

In 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law Assembly Bill 1747, “School Safety Plans”, which added Section 32281(a) to the California Education Code (EC), requiring every K-12 public school to develop and maintain a Comprehensive School Safety Plan (CSSP). The California Department of Education (CDE) stated that these plans are to “address campus risks, prepare for emergencies, and create a safe, secure learning environment for students and school personnel.” If a school district has fewer than 2,501 average daily attendance, then the district may create one CSSP for all the schools in that district. The law does require that stakeholders be engaged in the creation of the CSSP along with school personnel. Each school must update and adopt its CSSP annually by March 1st. That plan must then be submitted to the school district for approval. Each district is required to annually notify the CDE by October 15 of any school(s) that have not complied with the requirements of the law.

While it is truly fortunate that Orange County schools have not experienced this type of violence, numerous law enforcement and school officials say it is not a matter of “if” but “when”. Our schools must be prepared and vigilant to do all that can be done to prevent another Covenant School (Nashville), Robb Elementary (Uvalde), Saugus High (Saugus), Stoneman-Douglas High (Parkland), Sandy Hook (Newtown), or Columbine (Littleton) from taking place here.

(See Appendix ‘A’ for a listing of school shootings in the United States since 1999; see Appendix ‘B’ for CDE’s Comprehensive School Safety Plan requirements.)

“School is the last place where kids should have to worry about gun violence. Our children deserve better.” (Everytown Report, 8/22)

School Resource Officers (SROs)

“It was after school hours in May 2022 when South Carolina school resource officer (SRO) Kyle Doiron of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department got a message from a student at the high school where he works. The student forwarded an Instagram photo in which another student posed with a firearm.” The next day, the SRO called the boy in the photo out into the hallway. Inside the student’s backpack, “...he found a 9 mm Taurus handgun, with a loaded magazine and a cartridge in the chamber... At that point, Doiron arrested the student and placed him in handcuffs... Since the officer is on the high school campus every day, he has developed a relationship with students such

that they are comfortable talking to him.” After this incident, Officer Doiron said, *“If our school didn’t have an SRO program, there could have been another shooting and we could have lost another child to gun violence.”* (NASRO website, March 23, 2023) While this incident took place on the other side of the country, it illustrates the importance and value of having SROs on school campuses.

What exactly is an SRO? The U.S. Department of Justice defines a School Resource Officer as a *“sworn law enforcement officer responsible for safety and crime prevention in schools.”* Employed by a local police or sheriff’s department, they work closely with school administrators for the purpose of creating a safer environment for students, faculty, and staff. SROs are asked to be educators, informal counselors, and law enforcers, often called *“The Triad of SRO Responsibility”*. As they are sworn officers, they have the authority to make arrests, respond to calls for service, and document incidents. In the other two roles they work with students as mentors and role models. It is estimated by the National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO), that there are between 14,000 and 20,000 SROs currently working for law enforcement agencies across the nation.

“School Resource Officers play an important role in school violence prevention”

(U.S. Secret Service report, Averting Targeted School Violence, 2021)

SROs are funded by the law enforcement agency itself or by cities/school districts where they are assigned. They should be trained in school-based law enforcement as well as crisis response. Education Week reported in a November 16, 2021, article that: *“In practice, it’s not clear how many school police actually have had this training or similar types as States set different requirements for what training SROs need to have before working in schools, and some SROs report feeling unprepared for the job... In a 2018 Education Week Research Survey of SROs, about 1 in 5 respondents said they didn’t have sufficient training to work in a school environment, only 39 percent said they had training on child trauma, and about half said they hadn’t been trained to work with special education students.”* Training is available through local agencies as well as the NASRO. An officer appointed to an SRO position should be given the appropriate training to be effective. All Orange County Sheriff’s Department SROs interviewed by the Grand Jury indicated that they had received the required training.

Figures from the Education Week Research Survey show that in 2017-18, about 45% of schools had an SRO in place at least once a week and 13% reported having police on campus who were not SROs. There has been a large increase in the number of law enforcement agencies that employ SROs because of the increase in school shootings after Columbine in 1999. This mass shooting incident was the impetus for the U.S. Department of Justice to offer Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants to school districts to increase the number of SROs. Available grants can help off-set the costs of securing the services of SROs. In 2021, out of a \$386 million budget, \$156.5

million was authorized for the COPS Hiring Program (CHP) along with another \$11 million for Preparing for Active Shooter Situations (PASS) and \$53 million for the School Violence Prevention Program (SVPP). The CHP program provides 75% of the approved entry-level salaries and fringe benefits of each hired officer, up to \$125,000 per officer position for 36 months of salary support. In addition, groups such as the National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) offer attractive grants for the express purpose of hiring SROs.

“...in nearly one-third of the cases, an SRO played a role in disrupting an attack plot.”

(U.S. Secret Service report 2021)

However, funding remains a huge obstacle for cities, school districts, and law enforcement agencies. For example, following the 2018 mass shooting at Stoneman-Douglas High School in Florida, the governor at the time ordered an armed security officer be placed on the campus of all 4,200 public schools in the state at a huge cost.

The Grand Jury found that Orange County is fortunate that the Sheriff's Department (OCSD) and most city police departments (PDs) interviewed have a number of Deputies or officers who serve as SROs. Many who were interviewed shared that they take the position very seriously especially because their own children are in Orange County public schools. However, funding is a major factor in the number each agency is able to put into service. While the men and women who serve as SROs are highly dedicated, many current SROs in the county are assigned far too many schools to effectively fulfill their responsibilities. Most SROs in the county are assigned to high school campuses and must also cover a number of middle/elementary schools that feed into the high school.

The agency with the most SROs is the OCSD with 17 serving over 125 schools, located primarily in south Orange County. The Anaheim PD currently has two SROs to cover approximately 62 public schools with an Anaheim address. Fullerton PD has four SROs in four Fullerton Union High School District schools, yet approximately 20 elementary/middle schools in the Fullerton (Elementary) School District do not have an SRO, relying on patrol officers to be their contact with the police department. The City of Orange PD has one SRO for approximately 28 schools, while a small city and district such as Los Alamitos has one SRO for four schools. Santa Ana is the only school district that has its own police department. They field 28 sworn officers plus 42 site safety officers for 61 schools.

These figures, while not covering all police departments and cities, illustrate that law enforcement agencies around the county have put varying resources into their SRO programs. However, current SRO resources are far from an optimum number of personnel for the 635 public schools in Orange County. Most law enforcement members interviewed by the Grand Jury clearly indicated that not every school needs an SRO on

campus, with most of the need being found on high school and middle school campuses. However, the question remains as to why there are not more law enforcement personnel assigned to this important role.

Two prominent factors are impacting the number of SROs. First is the reality that most law-enforcement agencies are short-staffed and have increasing difficulty hiring qualified individuals which results in many officers being assigned to patrol duties to cover a city's needs. Second is the ever-present issue of funding. SRO positions, as mentioned earlier, are usually jointly funded by a law enforcement agency, a city, and/or a school district. The range for law enforcement salaries in Orange County is from \$50,000 to \$124,000 plus benefits.

Orange County school districts, city police departments, the sheriff's department, and city governments are strongly encouraged to work together to provide SROs on as many school campuses as financially feasible. Effectively utilized, SROs become informal counselors, role models, and mentors to students, many of whom might otherwise see police in a negative light. If students see an SRO on their campus on a regular basis, most will become comfortable with the idea of speaking with that officer which in turn forms a valuable relationship. "Building strong relationships helps keep schools safe; when young people build trusting relationships with SROs, they learn lessons that can remain with them into adulthood and throughout their lives." (Marin County Civil Grand Jury Report, 2019)

Implementing a School Tip Line

Students will often have the earliest and most knowledge of potential threats in a school community. Unfortunately, it is often the case that students are afraid to report threats when they become aware.

Depending on their features, tip lines may offer low-cost solutions for the purpose of acting upon reported information of potential violent acts taken from social media, including but not limited to phones, web portals, and other electronic messaging.

Tip lines may help prevent school violence by:

- Breaking the code of silence by giving a voice to students
- Increasing the likelihood that threats will be reported by providing a confidential means of reporting
- Encouraging students to "see something, say something"

Necessary requirements for a successful school tip line:

- Students must have easy access to the tip line
- Students must be able to trust that the tips they report will result in appropriate action
- Students must be able to trust that their identities will be kept confidential

The Grand Jury recommends that all public schools in Orange County, if they have not already done so, implement a tip reporting mechanism for all students and staff to confidentially report potential acts of violence on their school campus.

Safety of Before and After School Programs on School Sites

How safe are Orange County students in on-campus before and after school programs? Imagine one day, elementary students are sitting at school lunch tables, with classes over for the day, doing homework, art, or other activities; now a shooter walks onto the campus. Maybe the students are in a prefabricated bungalow at the back of the campus, away from any lingering staff's attention, sheltered by thin walls that are easily pierced by bullets. Will our schools be prepared when that eventually happens?

When developing safety and security plans for K-12 schools in Orange County, school districts should take extra steps to ensure that their plans include measures to prepare on-campus before and after school programs' staff for active shooter incidents. This can be a challenge as many of these programs throughout Orange County are outsourced to vendors such as the YMCA Child Care Program, Boys and Girls Club, or Kids Factory. Before and after school programs offer valuable school care for many families throughout Orange County. It is critical that the staff of these vendors be provided active shooter training, either along with school staff or independently.

Many vendors that offer before and after school programs have their own safety protocols, but they might not be as extensive as those within Orange County school districts. Each school district should review not only their own safety plans, but those of their vendors who provide before and after school programs to ensure that best practices are followed. If direct participation in school districts' active shooter training by outside vendors is not feasible, Orange County school districts have an obligation to ensure that those programs have established best practices in preparation for active shooters. Any gap in active shooter training for employees of vendors providing before and after school care should be addressed. A willingness to negotiate may be required between school districts and vendors to achieve a synergy among their safety policies and protocols.

A *U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School Violence* has concluded that in any given year, violence on school campuses occurs before or after school hours 26% of the time. This is a significant degree of risk to our children's safety and should be addressed in all Orange County school districts' safety plans.

Collaboration between SROs and school administrators is an important component for the integration of before and after school programs within school safety plans. All Orange County school districts that have SROs should involve them in the process of updating school safety plans to ensure that before and after school programs are integrated into active shooter protocols and procedures.

Monitoring Campuses

Security cameras may help school administrators monitor people who enter the campus and determine if there are people who should not be on school property. Security camera technology has improved in recent years, and all Orange County school districts should obtain and incorporate camera systems throughout their campuses. Some Orange County school districts lack cameras in all elementary schools leaving them unable to monitor school violence, crime, or intruder activity as well as gathering evidence of those events.

Advanced technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) powered school surveillance cameras, motion detection, people counting, thermal imaging cameras, and others are becoming more commonly used on school campuses throughout the United States as incidents of violence increase. Through AI technology, school staff can use facial recognition to monitor people entering and exiting the campus in real-time, thus increasing enhanced situational awareness.

Although some parents and students may feel security cameras can be intrusive, they can significantly increase safety. AI technology can assist school administrators in tracking the number of students entering school at the beginning of the school day and how many students exited the campus during an evacuation.



AI technology can help school districts with limited budgets make their current security devices perform more effectively. Facial recognition and perimeter detection are key improvements that AI brings to camera monitoring systems. Such advancements alert the security staff by raising real-time alarms upon detecting any unauthorized face or suspicious activity.

Orange County school campuses should have security cameras at strategic locations including entrances, hallways, stairwells, libraries, and parking lots. This level of coverage could give school administrators the ability to detect unfolding active shooter incidents and other emergencies.

Although security cameras cannot stop an active shooter, the simple presence of security cameras throughout school campuses can aid school security teams and local law enforcement in their responses to emergencies and provide evidentiary footage in their investigations.

There are many choices of security monitoring systems in a wide price range such as:

- Dome Security Cameras: Their wide-angle lens allows for maximum coverage.
- Bullet Security Cameras: They provide high definition, crisp photos even in dim light. They attach to walls or ceilings and can be positioned in any direction.
- PTZ Security Cameras: They are similar to dome cameras but have the ability to pan, tilt, and zoom.

Advanced Technology

The safety of students and staff should be a top priority for schools. Gaps in security can leave schools vulnerable. Current advanced technology can computerize manual processes that may leave schools open to potential security risks. Schools need to make sure that their security systems are contemporary and able to protect students and staff from any potential threats.

Some advanced school security trends are as follows:

- A Visitor Management System (VMS): Schools can use this system to help ensure the safety and security of their campuses. This system eliminates manual logs while simplifying check-ins as well as providing background screening for visitors. Most systems will flag registered sex offenders and child custody orders.
- Perimeter Security Systems: From cameras to license plate readers and access control systems, these tools provide real-time monitoring that protects against potential threats. Automated license plate recognition (ALPR) cameras are an asset in emergency situations, providing useful information for response and investigative purposes.

By staying up to date on the latest advances in school security technology, school administrators can make sure that their schools remain as safe as possible for all students and staff. The Grand Jury recommends to all school districts that as funding becomes available for school security, school districts consider implementing the advanced technology solutions identified above.

Protective Covering/Tinted Windows

While everyone in Orange County wants safer schools, some communities favor an open and friendly educational environment for their children and are concerned about having school campuses that resemble a prison-like environment.

However, one of the problems with the open design of many school campuses throughout Orange County is that there is too much visibility into classrooms from outside areas open to the public. Many classrooms lack curtains, mini-blinds, or other

basic window coverings to obscure an intruder's view. Securing classroom windows will help create a safer learning environment for students.

School districts should cover school windows with shatter-resistant and/or tinted film covering to add an additional layer of protection from an active shooter. Although these measures will not prevent an intruder from entering a school campus and begin shooting, it can slow their progress and reduce visibility into the classrooms.

In an active shooter scenario, shatter-resistant film can slow down an intruder and reduce the impact of ammunition fired into classrooms, giving teachers and students more time to escape or hide. It can also assist law enforcement in recovering spent ammunition. Shatter-resistant film can be purchased as a tinted or clear covering.

Clear shatter-resistant covering applied over windows can be painted with a festive design or historical figure in American history to help school administrators maintain an inviting campus. To engage students and the community, school staff could even have an art competition to see who comes up with the best theme or design for the windows.

While the possibility of an active shooter on a school campus has gripped the country with fear, Orange County residents do not need to have schools that resemble fortresses to take preventative measures against violent intruders.

Orange County school districts should exhaust all their capabilities to address campus vulnerabilities around physical security.



School Active Shooter Training

The Orange County Sheriff's Department, in collaboration with city police departments, conducts Active Shooter Training exercises for first responders, which include School

Resource Officers, Sheriff's Deputies, fire personnel, medical personnel, and the OCSD Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT). These exercises are held at local schools when classes are not in session, and other sites and training areas that can be used to simulate a school setting.

Several members of the 2022-2023 Grand Jury observed an active shooter training for local law enforcement at an Orange County high school which was not in session. Signage was posted around the school to notify the public of the training and immediately surrounding residents and businesses were advised of the event to avoid unnecessary panic.

The training began with a basic classroom power point presentation outlining the strategy and mission. Best practices and the reason for the training were also explained.

Upon completion of the briefing, shots were fired, and a smoke canister was ignited. Officers entered on the ground floor with handguns and rifles drawn. They then proceeded to the second floor, searching for the threat while a dozen OCSD Explorers and approximately 40 student volunteers served as actors portraying the injured pleading for help. The volunteers, student-actors who were to be subjected to simulated gunfire, were equipped with full-coverage helmets. They adhered to "Run, Hide, Fight", a protocol of survival skills which is taught in Orange County schools as a response to an active shooter situation.

Orange County Sheriff's Deputies are trained to arrive and immediately enter to put down the threat before lives, or additional lives, are lost. Once a threat is observed or heard, law enforcement enters the classroom or campus area and immediately eliminates the threat. The training is to instill in law enforcement an ability to react to the situation presented quickly and then take additional actions as warranted.

"The body won't go where the mind hasn't been and this training does just that" (OCSD)

Officers on the scene were armed with rifles, handguns, and smoke grenades. They were also equipped with battering rams and forced entry devices. Their firearms were loaded with blanks and paint tips. The only live ammunition was with a unit of Sheriff's Deputies who did not participate in the exercise but who surrounded the perimeter of the school solely to ensure the safety of the participants from any outside attackers who might take advantage of the chaos to harm participants.

This training is part of the Safe Schools Initiative offered by the Orange County Department of Education (OCDE), and ties into the Orange County Sheriff's Department's Assess, Prepare and Train (APT) program.

At the training attended and observed by the Grand Jury members, two scenarios were performed. The first was an approximately twenty-minute outdoor scene where shots were heard, and first responders were called in. Chaos was rampant as there was a smoke distraction while people were running (or hobbling) in different directions. Injured stand-ins were on the ground screaming and begging for help. Officers are trained to go right to and eliminate the threat despite the urge to lend aid to the wounded.

In the second scenario, Deputies and SROs entered a chaotic active shooter scene, stepped over “dead and injured” victims, and chased a male shooter who now had taken a hostage who was used as a shield. The perpetrator entered a room inside the school and concealed himself. Officers searched and cleared every classroom until a locked door was discovered in a service room. Officers announced their presence and forced open the door, the hostage was separated from the shooter, and a surrender took place, so the shooter was taken into custody, eliminating the threat.

Procedures are built into the training to ensure that police do not mistake innocent bystanders for the shooter. Police will not stop to help injured people until the threat is eliminated. Once the school is “cleared” of any further threat, waiting emergency medical personnel enter to stop the bleeding of the wounded, who are then taken to medical triage.

END-EX (end of exercise) was called by the trainers, and the actions of the Sheriff’s Deputies and other participants were reviewed, critiqued, and questions addressed.

These drills are not unique to Orange County, and many have proven their value. In Nashville, Tennessee, similar drills were being conducted at area schools and included school staff. Dr. Katherine Koonce, Director at Covenant School, attended one as an observer and immediately requested an exercise for her school.

During the March 27, 2023, shooting at the Covenant School, Dr. Koonce, while losing her own life, along with other staff saved countless lives. Nashville Metro Police Chief John Drake described it this way: “Students were in their classrooms, locked up, the professional [school staff] outdoors to lead the Metro policeman. She had a key, [knew] what her headcount was, she knew [exactly] where the students would be, she was prepared,” Drake told ABC News. “I’m sure they had run those drills, and it’s because of Katherine and the foresight she had to make sure her staffers were prepared.”

Under the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Act, public K-12 schools in Florida are required to hold frequent active shooter drills. The Grand Jury hopes a tragedy like those that occurred at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, Covenant School in Nashville, Tennessee, and other schools across the nation does not have to happen in California. However, it is necessary to prepare for that possibility. Therefore, the Grand Jury recommends that all school districts host Active Shooter Training by July 1, 2024, and thereafter on an every-other-year basis.

School Active Shooter Tabletop Exercises

The Orange County Sheriff’s Department School Resource Officer Program, along with a designated Orange County school, sponsors active shooter tabletop exercises for

schools within Orange County. The tabletop exercise is an emergency management technique designed to increase preparedness for an active shooter in a safe environment.

These exercises are generally held on a school campus and directed by a Facilitator designated by the Sheriff. Currently, the tabletop exercises are attended by on-site school personnel, law enforcement, and observers. Other schools within the district are invited to participate, as well as local city police. In the exercises the Grand Jury attended, the schools were represented by the principal and other school staff including teachers, district staff, school security personnel, maintenance personnel, and mental health counselors. Law enforcement attendance consisted of the Facilitator, School Resource Officers, and officers from OCSD's Operations Division. The Orange County Grand Jurors attended as observers but were able to participate in discussions.

The participants are presented with a crisis scenario and asked to discuss their response. It is important that plans be customized to the individual schools because of the different layouts and points of access and egress of each school campus. School maps are included in the provided Situation Manual to accommodate this need.

All attendees were given a Situation Manual which provides participants with all necessary tools for their roles in the exercise. The manual calls out the overview for the exercise, the roles and responsibilities of the participants, and the structure which is broken down into three modules.

The Situation Manual also points out the "Scenario Ground Truth" which allows participants to know what conditions to assume prior to facing their scenario, such as the time of day, weather at the time of the occurrence, and the staffing level of first responders.

The tabletop exercise is discussion based, planned to last approximately 90 minutes, and presented in three modules:

Module One: Preparedness

This module is a discussion of the preparedness of the school(s) where the level of security, access, and communication is addressed. Fencing (coverage and height), cameras, door locks, points of egress, using items to block doors, and window covers are among items discussed for facilities. Two-way radio communication, a public address system for lock-down announcements, lanyard alarms, and cell phones are some of the items discussed as tools for communication. This discussion brings in ideas to improve a school's preparedness while the school also brings information for the Facilitator to use in future tabletop exercises.

Module Two: Incident Response

In Module Two, a realistic scenario is presented to the participants where a report comes in from 911, stating that possible gunshots have been heard at the school and patrol units have been dispatched to the scene.

Discussion starts with school personnel describing how the school goes into lockdown to protect staff and students while a command post is set up near the school. This is when school officials discuss and share information such as accounting for all students, tying phones to the District Office, and other communication efforts.

Module Three: Student / Family Re-Unification

This final module deals with the aftermath; the shooter has been neutralized and rooms and buildings have been cleared by law enforcement. At the exercise observed by members of the Grand Jury, preliminary information provided for the sake of discussion indicated that five students and staff were deceased and 15-20 injured that had been, or were in the process of being, transported to local hospitals.

The tabletop discussion then deals with orderly release and relocation to nearby off-site triage and reunification locations. There is also discussion about what information can and cannot be passed on to parents. Ideas for managing the media and what can be released and who can interface with media are also discussed. Mental health support and its role are discussed in this module as well.

The success of the tabletop exercise lies in the practice and review of required actions and the delegation of duties during this experience. Although predicting each person's reaction and judgement during such a crisis is recognized as impossible, this exercise enhances the probability of team efficiency in the event of a school shooting, thereby increasing preparedness and minimizing loss of life and injury.

Due to turnover and relocation of school personnel, the Grand Jury recommends that all Orange County school districts host Active Shooter Tabletop Exercises by December 31, 2023, and on an annual basis thereafter. (See Appendix C; OCSD tabletop format)

Arming Teachers and Staff

The California Teachers Association (CTA), while overwhelmingly supporting stronger laws to ensure school safety, believes the idea of arming teachers is a *“preposterous, cynical, and unworkable solution.”*

The Grand Jury found that practically no faculty, staff, or superintendent in Orange County supported arming any non-law enforcement school personnel. The resistance to this idea by educational personnel was overwhelming.

Among the reasons given by school personnel were the obvious ones of injury or death of innocent students or staff, and law enforcement mistaking anyone holding a weapon as the suspect. Another reason was that without ongoing training, people lose the physiological responses to stress that enable fine motor skills and marksmanship.

While representing a tiny minority of their peers, some in law enforcement would support arming school personnel, but only with stringent restrictions such as rigorous training, marksmanship, and proven sound judgement. The sole reason given by this small number of law enforcement personnel is that a threat could be eliminated prior to a first responder arriving, leading to saved lives in the beginning. Most law enforcement

personnel believe arming of any non-law enforcement school personnel to be an unacceptable idea under any circumstance.

Visitor Management System

The 2022-23 Grand Jury believes that a parent and visitor management system is a key element in ensuring campus safety.

The 2017-18 Grand Jury included two recommendations related to managing campus visitors in its report titled: *Safer Schools – What Can We Do?* Those recommendations were:

R.3. School districts should implement procedures to ensure that all campuses maintain a complete, daily log (electronic or manual) of every visitor and volunteer entering and exiting the campus, excluding program events such as awards ceremonies or stage or musical productions (2017-2018).

R.4. School districts should implement procedures to ensure that photo identification is required of all campus visitors and volunteers before a visitor's badge is issued (2017-2018).

As a part of its investigation in preparation for writing this report on school safety, the 2022-23 Grand Jury learned that 25 of the 28 Orange County School Districts have a parent and visitor management system.

Twenty-one of 25 districts use the same software system which:

- Gives schools the power to decide exactly who is allowed to enter their buildings.
- Enables schools to keep potential threats from accessing campus by instantly screening each visitor's government-issued ID card against the sex offender registries in all 50 states and an unlimited number of custom databases.
- Syncs with a school's information system to ensure that students are only released to approved guardians.
- If a visitor is flagged, allows staff to review the visitor's information side-by-side with the offender's information immediately while notifications are sent to administrative and security personnel.
- Allows a school's community to know that visitors are approved by enabling a school to require visitors to wear a badge that shows their role type, name, destination, date and time of entry, and photo.
- Enables approved school personnel to view Visitor records so that accurate district- and school-wide reports can be created.

Even though 25 of the 28 school districts already have an effective parent and visitor management system, the Grand Jury believes managing access to school campuses is so important that all schools should either develop or purchase a system that enables them to control and monitor access to campus.

Annual Safety Inspection

All California public schools must develop a comprehensive school safety plan, per California Education Code sections 32280-32289.5. The OCGJ believes annual campus safety inspections conducted with local law enforcement should be a part of this plan. During its investigation for this report, the OCGJ learned that some schools are already conducting such inspections.

The three primary sources of information for this section were:

- School district responses to the Findings and Recommendations in the Grand Jury 2017-2018 Report titled *Safer Schools – What Can We Do?*
- School district responses to a survey developed by the 2022-23 Grand Jury designed to determine if school districts had followed up on 2017-2018 commitments to implement specific improvements in school safety.
- The websites of the 28 school districts.

From these three sources, the Grand Jury learned that at least 21 of the 28 school districts work to help ensure the safety of school campuses through on-going collaborative relationships with either the Sheriff's Department or city police departments or, in some instances, with both the Sheriff's Department and one or more police departments. Nine districts reported having at least one Student Resource Officer (SRO) serving one or more schools.

Fifteen of the 21 districts that reported collaborative working relationships with at least one local law enforcement department also reported conducting annual safety assessments. Even though all 15 districts may conduct their annual safety inspections in collaboration with local law enforcement, only 5 of these 15 districts reported doing so.

The seven districts that did not report working to help ensure the safety of school campuses through on-going collaborative relationships with either the Sheriff's Department or city police departments may have ongoing collaborative working relationships with local law enforcement. However, the Grand Jury was unable to find documentation of such relationships in any of its three above-listed sources.

The Grand Jury believes all Orange County school districts that have not done so should develop and maintain ongoing collaborative working relationships with local law enforcement. The Grand Jury also believes that all Orange County School Districts should arrange for their local law enforcement partner(s) to conduct an annual safety assessment of each school in collaboration with the appropriate school and district administrative staff, facilitated via a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) if necessary, by July 1, 2024.

Homeland Security K-12 School Safety Checklist

In their responses to the 2017-18 Safer Schools Report Findings and Recommendations, two Orange County school districts reported using the Homeland

Security K-12 School Safety Checklist. In its 2022-23 review of school district websites, the OCGJ identified one additional district that reported using the Homeland Security Checklist. Given the source of the survey and the fact that at least three Orange County school districts have chosen to use the survey, the OCGJ decided to review the survey. During its review, the OCGJ learned that the survey consists of 150 incisive questions that forces users to carefully analyze the strengths and weaknesses of their school safety plan.

Following its review of the K-12 School Safety Checklist, the OCGJ believes that all 28 Orange County School Districts should require each of their schools to annually administer either the Homeland Security checklist, or a similar checklist.

(See Appendix D for Seven Primary Topics of the DHS survey along with the appropriate web site for access to the entire survey.)

Campus Entry Procedures

The Grand Jury believes the campus entry at most Orange County schools is vulnerable to intruders.

Using information gathered from school district responses to both the 2017-18 Safer Schools Report and the 2022-2023 Grand Jury follow-up survey on the implementation of commitments made by school districts in response to the 2017-18 Report, the Grand Jury has learned that at least 13 of the 27 Orange County school districts that responded to the Report have perimeter fencing and a single point of entry. One of the 13 school districts reported also having cameras and a buzzer system to augment the single point of entry. Another school reported the use of an intercom and buzzer system to control access to the administrative offices. Some of the other 11 districts with perimeter fencing and single point of entry may have cameras and buzzer systems, but the Grand Jury was unable to make that determination.

Three school districts reported having perimeter fencing at all schools but not a single point of entry. Three other school districts, with a total of 45 schools, reported that 41 of the 45 schools have perimeter fencing.

Four districts reported a mix of fenced and unfenced schools. One district reported that it has cameras and access control door systems, but no fencing.

Three districts reported that they have no fencing, and one of those three commented that there “may be (community) opposition” to fencing.

Based on the information available to the 2022-2023 Grand Jury, only one school district has implemented campus entry procedures that incorporate all the features recommended by the 2017-18 Grand Jury.

Furthermore, even though at least 24 of the remaining 27 school districts have implemented some safety measures to protect the entryways into schools, most, if not all, could be accessed by an intruder.

Therefore, the Grand Jury recommends all schools should review campus entry procedures. The review should include consideration of the use of perimeter fencing, a single point of entry, and the use of a camera and buzzer system to control entry into the main administrative office.



As with most other security measures, there have been improvements in wire mesh fencing. The new fencing is more closely woven, making it more difficult to scale, and thus making campuses more secure. The Grand Jury believes this new fencing should be the preferred fencing for those school districts erecting new fences or replacing existing fences.

Available School Safety Training Resources

Stop the Bleed

The Encyclopedia Britannica defines “First Aid” as “...measures to be taken immediately after an accident not with an idea to cure but in order to prevent further harm being done.” Available people and material supplies are used at the site of an incident to provide initial care to the victim until more advanced care is secured. The objectives of First Aid:

- To preserve and maintain life
- To prevent the victim’s condition from worsening
- To aid in recovery

The Stop the Bleed course teaches class participants three techniques to prevent loss of blood from a bullet wound:

- How to use your hands to apply pressure to a wound
- How to pack a wound to control bleeding
- How to apply a tourniquet correctly



Casualty Care

Crisis Medicine is just one of the many contractors that provide emergency medical training for non-medical personnel. Members of the Grand Jury reviewed the *Essential Casualty Care* course and determined it to be realistic and well done. Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) is the basis for this type of training, and like the philosophy of Active Shooter Training is intended to prepare bystanders and survivors to react quickly to save lives by providing life support until the arrival of paramedics.

This type of training is realistic enough to prepare individuals to act without experiencing shock and freezing in a life and death situation. Topics covered in this training included viewing gunshot wounds, learning how to focus on the most life-threatening damage first, and the different treatments available like tourniquets, packing the wound, pressure application, and splinting.

Equipment and supply training is also given so that suitable trauma kits, hemorrhage control kits, tourniquet kits and other medical supplies can be pre-stocked and maintained at locations where an incident may occur.

Knowledge Saves Lives

Knowledge Saves Lives is one of many contractors that school districts can hire to help district and school personnel prepare for the likelihood of a potential school shooter. The primary benefit of such preparations is to improve reaction times, eliminating the initial human tendency to freeze, and to save lives when an incident does occur.

Members of the Grand Jury attended one of these training sessions and were quite impressed with the willingness and intensity of the school district representatives and staff from the schools who attended training.

Instructors were current or retired police officers knowledgeable in responding to an active shooter situation. The first element of training dealt with prevention and how to identify troubled potential perpetrators during the days or weeks prior to a shooting. Prevention includes always being aware of actions and words of individuals around us, and to **say something when you see something**. One of the surprising facts shared is that 91% of potential incidents fail because someone became aware of it and took appropriate action to report it. Situational awareness was presented as observing people and knowing the space around you. “Leakage” was identified as clues that someone may be disturbed and planning violent action.

The other part of training focuses on *Run, Hide, Fight* which is intended to prepare staff for the three main options available to potential victims of an active shooter incident. Exercises were conducted with all participants in these three scenarios. Put simply, *Run* is putting distance between potential victims and the threat.

Hide is primarily locking doors and obstructing views. *Fight* is locating and improvising a weapon, such as a fire extinguisher, and using it on the shooter. Participants were shown and then performed the steps to make such an effective attack.

This training and practice are incredibly important to motor memory, so reaction times are shortened. The more quickly action is taken, the fewer casualties may occur.

When law enforcement arrives:

- Stay calm and follow instructions
- Put down any items in your hands
- Keep hands raised and visible at all times
- Do not make any quick movements toward officers
- Do not point, scream, or yell
- Do not speak or ask questions when evacuating unless asked to do so by an officer.

The Grand Jury recommends that all Orange County school districts incorporate Knowledge Saves Lives, Stop the Bleed, Casualty Care and Run, Hide Fight or some combination of this training for all schools in their district on a yearly rotating basis.

“...the odds of your child’s school being in a shooting in their lifetime is 1 in 62.51 or 1.6%”

(Web Site-Donovan and PsychLaw Journal)

Mental Health Issues

Background Studies

When examining causes behind the epidemic of active shooter situations in our schools, it is helpful to consult the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well as the United States Secret Service (USSS) and their extensive research in identifying behaviors exhibited by these shooters. In 2018, the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit produced a report entitled "*Study of Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters*". The report opens with these reminders:

- There is not one "profile" of an active shooter
- There is no single warning sign, checklist, or algorithm for assessing behaviors that identifies a prospective active shooter
- While impossible to predict violent behavior, it is possible to prevent some attacks via effective threat assessment and management strategies.

This report is instructive for the purposes of this Grand Jury report because it identifies the most common stressors experienced by active shooters. These stressors include such things as financial strain, conflict with friends/peers, and conflict at school, but by far the one stressor that appears the most (62%) in the cases studied is mental health.

The report indicated that "25% of active shooters had a diagnosed mental illness prior to the offense." The report further stated that of those who noted the concerning behavior of an individual such as mental health issues, 92% were identified by a schoolmate and 75% by a teacher/school staff, if the shooter was a student.

In 2019, the United States Secret Service (USSS) and U.S. Department of Justice's National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) issued a report, *Protecting America's Schools-A United States Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School Violence*. Among the key findings from the report were:

- There is no profile of a student attacker, nor is there a profile for the type of school that has been targeted
- Attackers usually had multiple motives, the most common involving a grievance with classmates
- All attackers experienced social stressors involving relationships with peers and others
- Most attackers were victims of bullying which was often observed by others
- All attackers exhibited concerning behaviors. Most elicited concern from others and most communicated their intent to attack.

The report further noted that the observable mental health symptoms displayed by attackers prior to their attacks were divided into three main categories:

- Psychological (e.g., symptoms of depression, anxiety, anger, or suicidal ideation)
- Behavioral (e.g., defiance/misconduct, aggression, or symptoms of ADD/ADHD)
- Neurological (e.g., developmental delays or cognitive deficits)

“The fact that half of the attackers studied had received one or more mental health services prior to their attack indicates that mental health evaluations and treatment should be considered a component of a multidisciplinary threat assessment but not a replacement... Mental health professionals should be included in a collaborative threat assessment process that also involves teachers, administrators, and law enforcement.”

In 2021, the USSS produced a report, *“Averting Targeted School Violence”* which amongst many salient points, addressed the issue of Mental Health as it pertains to active school shooters. They found that:

- “Many plotters (70%) exhibited behaviors indicating the presence of some type of mental health symptom in the time leading up to, or around, the discovery of their plots.”
- “Information on these factors was evident in their journal writings, statements and behaviors observed by others, and histories of prior mental health treatment.”
- “Though some of the subjects were born with psychiatric or neurological conditions, others had mental health issues as a result of severe life stressors.”

Finally, in the 2021 *Report on Indicators of School Crime and Safety* produced by the Institute of Educational Sciences (IES), the issue of Mental Health was identified as one of the indicators they studied. They found the following:

- In 2019-20 (prior to the pandemic), 55% of public schools reported providing diagnostic mental health assessment services which were used to evaluate mental health disorders displayed by students in their schools.
- Only 42% offered mental health treatment for those mental health disorders.
- These services were more likely to be found in middle and high schools than in elementary schools.
- A majority of schools (54%) indicated that inadequate funding limited the mental health services they could provide.

These studies serve as factual evidence that schools and school districts should be, if they are not already, considering mental health issues when preparing their safety plans. The COVID-19 pandemic served to heighten the awareness of mental health issues which students everywhere were exhibiting because of the use of distance learning and its subsequent isolating factors. In a relatively short period of time, students in Orange County and across the nation found themselves cut off from not only friends and familiar activities, but for many, a safe and supportive school environment. They were thrown even deeper into the world of social media, leading many to develop the mental health stressors and signals identified in the cited reports.

The pandemic has created a generation of students who now are trying to cope with a return to what for many is an “alien” environment. Consider students who were just starting school when schools were forced to close. For more than two years at a very crucial time in their lives, these students were unable to experience the socialization process necessary to provide them with many of the tools necessary for their educational success and mental well-being. What is the overall impact on their educational experience? When one considers the disruption caused on all grade levels,

is there any doubt that the issue of the mental health of our students has to be at the heart of addressing the issue of active shooters?

Status of Mental Health Programs in Orange County Public Schools

The Grand Jury interviewed many school district and school site administrators along with representatives from a number of law enforcement agencies. The Grand Jury found the issue of Wellness Centers has gained acceptance primarily on the high school level and in some middle schools. Many elementary schools are still struggling to establish effective mental health programs. The major problem facing all school districts is funding. With the passage of the American Rescue Plan (ARP) by Congress in response to the pandemic, many districts chose to use funds to expand their mental health capabilities. This has resulted in additional school psychologists, social workers, counselors and behavioral interventionists being assigned to school sites. However, many principals shared that a full-time school psychologist has little time for mental health issues as they have to administer numerous tests for students with special needs as well as for other programs. Some elementary schools have turned to parent support organizations to raise funds for outside agencies to assist with the mental health needs of their students.

While law enforcement agencies do not usually have input in the area of mental health in schools, they are willing to engage with school officials when dealing with mental health issues particularly if the school has an assigned SRO. In addition, the Orange County Sheriff's Department (OCSD) employs what they designate as School Mobile Assessment & Resource Teams (SMART) who can and do involve themselves in mental health issues upon the request of school administrators. A few of Orange County's city police departments have joined with the OCSD to have a representative on a SMART team, however this relationship should be expanded.

An incident from the 2019 USSS-NTAC report *Protecting America's Schools* is an illustration of mental problems in schools:

"A 16-year-old student shot his high school principal in the arm before his weapon malfunctioned. Prior to this incident, the attacker exhibited a wide range of symptoms typically associated with depression. He began to isolate himself after his parent's divorce and while he had played multiple sports and enjoyed video games, the attacker withdrew from these activities as his depression worsened. He began going to school without shaving, showering, or washing his hair, and multiple people noted his body odor. The student reported feeling helpless, hopeless, and worthless and he said he had low energy, trouble sleeping, reduced appetite, decreased interest in activities and impaired concentration. His grades began to decline. He often sat alone in his room in the dark. He began having suicidal thoughts and came close to killing himself prior to the incident. According to media reports, a state psychiatrist concluded that mental illness played a role in the attacker's actions in carrying out the incident."

Conclusion

The good news from the information provided to the Grand Jury by many school administrators and law enforcement representatives is that Orange County public

school districts do acknowledge, that now more than in the past, they need to address the mental health issues found in their student bodies and they are doing so. However, more needs to be done to identify students having mental health issues, whether they be psychological, behavioral, or neurological. Ensuring that mental health or wellness centers on campuses are staffed by competent professionals, particularly at the middle and high school level, should be a high priority. These centers can be instrumental in helping to create a supportive school climate.

In 2020, Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia’s Center for Violence Prevention (CVP) issued a “white-paper” on mass shootings in schools. It identified a supportive school climate as being highly significant in preventing school shootings. The CVP noted that in this kind of environment:

- Students feel safe to talk to each other and to staff
- There is a mutual trust and respect among students and school staff
- There is on-going dialogue and relationships with family and community members that interact with the school
- There is adequate support, training, and resources for school staff

The Grand Jury strongly recommends that all Orange County public school districts work to provide mental health services to all schools in each district as an effective tool in helping to prevent potential active shooter incidents.

“A cohesive and supportive school environment is key to preventing school shootings.”
(Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia-CVP)

FINDINGS

In accordance with California Penal Code Sections 933 and 933.05, the 2022-2023 Grand Jury requires (or, as noted, requests) Responses from each agency affected by the Findings presented in this section. The Responses are to be submitted to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court.

Based on its investigation titled **School Shootings: How Prepared Are Orange County Public Schools?** the 2022-2023 Grand Jury has arrived at twelve Findings, as follows:

- F1** Law enforcement, first responders, and other stakeholders have demonstrated a strong interest in working cooperatively with Orange County public schools to mitigate the risk of an active shooter incident; establishment of MOUs between law enforcement and school districts would strengthen this cooperation.

- F2** All Orange County public schools studied by the Grand Jury stated that they conducted or have scheduled drills within the current school year on emergency procedures addressing intruders on campus, but not all have done so specifically regarding armed assailants.
- F3** While all districts prioritize the safety of students and staff, the attention and resources devoted to active shooter preparedness and response vary from district to district.
- F4** Safety and security plans for on-campus before and after-school programs are not adequately addressed by school districts.
- F5** While many Orange County public schools have installed fences, cameras, and other methods to address the issue of active shooters on a campus, there are still opportunities for improvement.
- F6** Not all schools utilize a system for monitoring campus visitors.
- F7** While there is an increased awareness of the benefits of mental health counseling, not all school districts have implemented these programs in all schools.
- F8** School Resource Officers (SROs) are a valuable asset for school safety, yet many cities/districts do not allocate sufficient funds to hire needed officers.
- F9** Not all classrooms have window shades, tinted glass, or film to obstruct the interior view from the outside.
- F10** The camera surveillance systems utilized on many campuses require repairs, replacement, or additions.
- F11** Many schools do not have perimeter fencing completely enclosing their campus.
- F12** A number of school districts have school site administrative offices that remain unlocked on a daily basis.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In accordance with California Penal Code Sections 933 and 933.05, the 2022-2023 Grand Jury requires (or, as noted, requests) responses from each agency affected by the Recommendations presented in this section. The Responses are to be submitted to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court.

Based on its investigation titled **School Shootings: How Prepared Are Orange County Public Schools?** the 2022-2023 Grand Jury makes the following thirteen Recommendations:

- R1** Each Orange County school district should arrange for local law enforcement to do an annual safety inspection of each school. The written safety checklist should include an audit of the integrity of site boundaries and a review of safety plans and policies. This annual safety audit should commence with the 2023-24 school year by October 1, 2023, and annually thereafter. (F1, F10, F11)
- R2** All Orange County school districts should establish a threat identification and assessment system for all school sites to monitor social media, screen for messages of concern, and manage information received in coordination with local law enforcement using MOUs, if necessary, by July 1, 2024. (F1, F3)
- R3** Each Orange County school district, in conjunction with law enforcement, should develop and implement tabletop exercises to be conducted in district schools by December 31, 2023, and annually thereafter. (F2)
- R4** Each Orange County school district should work with local law enforcement to plan and conduct a district-wide active shooter drill by July 1, 2024, and at least every other year thereafter. (F2)
- R5** All Orange County school districts should develop a casualty care training program for each school in their district, to be in place by the end of the first semester of the 2023-24 school year and provided annually thereafter. (F3)
- R6** Safety and security plans for on-campus before and after-school programs need to be addressed more thoroughly by school districts, by July 1, 2024. (F4)
- R7** Each Orange County school district should obtain and incorporate perimeter camera systems in all district schools by July 1, 2024, or earlier if financially able to do so, and investigate the potential use of cameras that incorporate Artificial Intelligence to enhance threat detection and prevention. (F5, F10)
- R8** All Orange County school districts should review entry procedures on all campuses with an eye toward the use of perimeter fencing, the use of single point entry, and the use of a buzzer and camera system for entry into the main/administrative offices. (F5, F12)

- R9** Each Orange County school district should Identify and implement a parent and visitor management system for each school site within the school district. This is to include identified access points, badges, or a similar identification procedure to be implemented by July 1, 2024. (F6, F11, F12)
- R10** Each Orange County school district should implement training for all staff to identify threat-related behaviors and provide a procedure for reporting the behavior by the beginning of the 2024-25 school year. (F7)
- R11** All Orange County school districts should develop a plan to implement or enhance mental health counseling for all schools by December 31, 2024. (F7)
- R12** Each Orange County School District should assess the need for SROs or additional SROs, reaching out to appropriate community partners to facilitate funding by July 1, 2024. (F8)
- R13** All Orange County school districts should investigate and consider bullet resistant or tinted film covering for school windows by December 31, 2023. (F9)

REQUIRED RESPONSES

California Penal Code Section 933 requires the governing body of any public agency which the Grand Jury has reviewed, and about which it has issued a final report, to comment to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court on the findings and recommendations pertaining to matters under the control of the governing body. Such comment shall be made no later than 90 days after the Grand Jury publishes its report (filed with the Clerk of the Court). Additionally, in the case of a report containing findings and recommendations pertaining to a department or agency headed by an elected County official (e.g., District Attorney, Sheriff, etc.), such elected County official shall comment on the findings and recommendations pertaining to the matters under that elected official's control within 60 days to the Presiding Judge with an information copy sent to the Board of Supervisors. Furthermore, California Penal Code Section 933.05 specifies the manner in which such comment(s) are to be made as follows:

(a) As to each Grand Jury finding, the responding person or entity shall indicate one of the following:

- (1) The respondent agrees with the finding.
- (2) The respondent disagrees wholly or partially with the finding; in which case the response shall specify the portion of the finding that is disputed and shall include an explanation of the reasons therefor.

(b) As to each Grand Jury recommendation, the responding person or entity shall report one of the following actions:

- (1) The recommendation has been implemented, with a summary regarding the action.
- (2) The recommendation has not yet been implemented, but will be implemented in the future, with a time frame for implementation.
- (3) The recommendation requires further analysis, with an explanation and the scope and parameters of an analysis or study, and a time frame for the matter to be prepared for discussion by the officer or head of the agency or department being investigated or reviewed, including the governing body of the public agency when applicable. This time frame shall not exceed six months from the date of publication of the Grand Jury report.
- (4) The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable, with an explanation, therefor.

(c) If a finding or recommendation of the Grand Jury addresses budgetary or personnel matters of a county agency or department headed by an elected officer, both the agency or department head and the Board of Supervisors shall respond if requested by the Grand Jury, but the response of the Board of Supervisors shall address only those budgetary /or personnel matters over which it has some decision-making authority. The

response of the elected agency or department head shall address all aspects of the findings or recommendations affecting his or her agency or department.

Comments to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court in compliance with Penal Code Section 933.05 are required from the governing body of each school district below:

Findings – 90 Day Response Required

Anaheim Elementary	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Anaheim UHSD	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Brea-Olinda Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Buena Park Elementary	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Capistrano Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Centralia Elementary	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Cypress Elementary	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Fountain Valley	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Fullerton Elementary	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Fullerton Joint UHSD	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Garden Grove Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Huntington Beach City	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Huntington Beach UHSD	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Irvine Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Laguna Beach Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
La Habra City	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Los Alamitos Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Lowell Joint Elementary	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Magnolia School	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Newport-Mesa Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Ocean View Elementary	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Orange Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Placentia-Yorba Linda	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Saddleback Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Santa Ana Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Savanna School	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Tustin Unified	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12
Westminster Elementary	F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12

City of Anaheim	F1, F8
City of Costa Mesa	F1, F8
City of Fountain Valley	F1, F8
City of Fullerton	F1, F8
City of Garden Grove	F1, F8
City of Huntington Beach	F1, F8
City of Irvine	F1, F8
City of Los Alamitos	F1, F8
City of Newport Beach	F1, F8
City of Orange	F1, F8
O.C. Sheriff's Department	F1, F8

Recommendations – 90 Day Response Required

Anaheim Elementary	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Anaheim UHSD	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Brea-Olinda Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Buena Park Elementary	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Capistrano Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Centralia Elementary	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Cypress Elementary	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Fountain Valley	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Fullerton Elementary	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Fullerton Joint UHSD	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Garden Grove Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Huntington Beach City	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Huntington Beach UHSD	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Irvine Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Laguna Beach Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
La Habra City	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Los Alamitos Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Lowell Joint Elementary	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Magnolia Elementary	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Newport-Mesa Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Ocean View Elementary	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Orange Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Placentia-Yorba Linda	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Saddleback Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Santa Ana Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Savanna Elementary	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Tustin Unified	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
Westminster Elementary	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13
City of Anaheim	R1, R3, R4, R12
City of Costa Mesa	R1, R3, R4, R12
City of Fountain Valley	R1, R3, R4, R12
City of Fullerton	R1, R3, R4, R12
City of Garden Grove	R1, R3, R4, R12
City of Huntington Beach	R1, R3, R4, R12
City of Irvine	R1, R3, R4, R12
City of Los Alamitos	R1, R3, R4, R12
City of Newport Beach	R1, R3, R4, R12
City of Orange	R1, R3, R4, R12
O.C. Sheriff's Department	R1, R3, R4, R12

GLOSSARY

Active Shooter

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines an active shooter as *“an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area... in most cases, active shooters use firearms and there is no pattern or method to this selection of victims.”*

AI Artificial Intelligence

The simulation of human intelligence in machines that can learn and problem solve.

Casualty Care Program

Teaches fundamentals of casualty care including how to treat casualty victims, what steps to take to prevent loss of life, and how to save lives while under active fire, among other topics.

CDC

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-The national public health agency of the United States.

CDE

California Department of Education

CHDS

Center for Homeland Defense and Security-Develops programs and resources to advance the study of homeland security research, scholarship, and professional disciplines to enhance U.S. National Security and Safety.

CHP

COPS Hiring Program-A competitive grant program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice to provide funding directly to law enforcement agencies to hire additional career law enforcement officers to increase community policing capabilities and crime prevention.

COPS

Community Oriented Policing Services-Part of the U.S. Department of Justice that is responsible for advancing the practice of community policing through various means such as competitive grants.

CSSP

Comprehensive School Safety Plans-Sections 32280-32289 of the California Education Code requires that all public school districts develop policies and procedures in response to common safety issues, including violence.

CSTAG

The Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines, originally known as the Virginia Student Threat Assessment Guidelines, is an evidence-based model for schools to use in conducting threat assessments of students.

DEE

Distance, Evade, Engage or Deny, Evade, Engage-Language used to describe how individuals/groups should respond to an active shooter situation.

DOJ

U.S. Department of Justice

DSO

District Safety Office-Term used by school districts to describe non-law enforcement personnel who help provide safety and security on school campuses.

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency-Part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that coordinates responses to disasters beyond the level states and local agencies can handle.

IES

Institutes of Educational Sciences-Independent, non-partisan, statistical research and evaluation arm of the U.S. Department of Education.

KFF

Kaiser Family Foundation-Non-profit organization dealing with health policy in the United States.

Lock-Bloc

Device used in many schools to ensure that a classroom or office door can be locked quickly in case of emergency.

NASRO

National Association of School Resource Officers-Professional organization serving the needs of School Resource Officers across the United States.

NTAC

National Threat and Assessment Center-Provides guidance and support to the United States Secret Service.

OCDE

Orange County Department of Education

OCIAC

Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center-Provides an integrated, multi-disciplined, informational and intelligence sharing network to collect, analyze and disseminate information on all criminal risks and safety threats to law enforcement, fire, health, private, and public sector stakeholders in a timely manner in order to protect residents, visitors, and critical infrastructure while ensuring the civil rights and civil liberties of all persons are recognized.

OCSD

Orange County Sheriff's Department

PASS

Preparing for Active Shooter Situations-Program from the U.S. Department of Justice designed to meet the goals of COPS by offering 'scenario-based' courses designed to counter active shooters.

RAPTOR System

A company founded in 2002 that has partnered with many school districts in the U.S., to provide integrated visitor management systems.

RHF

Run, Hide, Fight-Language used to describe how individuals/groups should respond to an active shooter situation.

SAVD-SS

School-Associated Violent Death Surveillance System-Sponsored by the CDC, providing the most recent details available on school associated violent deaths while helping to inform efforts to prevent school violence.

SMART

School Mobile Assessment and Resource Team-Part of the OCSD, this group works with school officials to address situations and incidents related to violence, threats, possession of or use of weapons, unstable behaviors, and suicidal tendencies by students.

SRO

School Resource Officer-Sworn law enforcement officers responsible for safety and crime prevention in schools who are employed by local police or sheriff departments and work closely with school administrators.

SRP

Standard Response Protocol-Provides consistent, clear shared language and actions among all student, staff and first responders which can be applied in any emergency.

SVPP

School Violence Prevention Program-Grants given to states and local agencies to improve safety and security on school campuses.

SWAT

Special Weapons and Tactics-A designated law enforcement team whose members are recruited, selected, trained, equipped, and assigned to resolve critical incidents involving a threat to public safety which would otherwise exceed the capabilities of local law enforcement departments.

Table-Top Exercises

An informal discussion-based session in which a team discusses their roles and responses during an emergency, walking through one or more scenarios.

TECC

Tactical Emergency Casualty Care-Based on military response to casualty care.

USDE

U.S. Department of Education

USSS

United States Secret Service

VMS

Visitor Management System-Used to control access to school campuses.

WETIP

Strives to be the most effective anonymous citizen's crime reporting resource, providing intelligence and information to local, state, and federal authorities.

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- Survey of SROs-Education Week Research Survey 2018

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Active Shooter Incidents in U.S. Schools Since 1999* (Material from Wikipedia)

Date	Location	School	Deaths	Injuries
3/27/2023	Nashville, TN	Covenant School	6	0
3/22/2023	Denver, CO	East High	0	2
2/13/2023	East Lansing, MI	Michigan State Univ.	5	9
12/8/2022	Tallahassee, FL	Florida A & M Univ.	1	4
11/13/2022	Charlottesville, VA	University of VA	3	2
10/24/2022	St. Louis, MO	Central V & P High	3	7
5/24/2022	Uvalde, TX	Robb Elementary	22	18
11/30/2022	Oxford, MI	Oxford High	4	7
11/14/2019	Santa Clara, CA	Saugus High	3	3
5/18/2018	Santa Fe, NM	Santa Fe High	10	14
2/14/2018	Parkland, FL	Stoneman-Douglas High	17	17
1/23/2018	Benton, KY	Marshall County High	2	16
12/7/2017	Aztec, NM	Aztec High	3	0
4/10/2017	San Bernardino, CA	North Park Elementary	3	1
9/28/2016	Townville, SC	Townville Elementary	2	3
12/12/2014	Portland, OR	Rosemary Anderson High	0	4
10/24/2014	Marysville, WN	Marysville Pilchuck High	5	1
12/14/2012	Newtown, CT	Sandy Hook Elementary	28	2
2/27/2012	Chardon, OH	Chardon High	3	3
10/2/2006	Bart Township, PA	West Nickel Mines Elem.	6	5
4/14/2003	New Orleans, LA	John Mc Donogh High	1	3
3/5/2001	Santee, CA	Santana High	2	13
5/20/1999	Conyers, GA	Heritage High	0	6
4/20/1999	Littleton, CO	Columbine High	15	24

*Does not include shootings such as by gangs, or revenge shootings around a school or on streets or parking lots near a school.

Appendix B

Comprehensive School Safety Plans

Best practice considerations and resources for reviewing and approving plans.

On September 27, 2018, Governor Brown signed into law Assembly Bill 1747-School Safety Plans. You will find AB 1747 in the California Legislative Information web page. Key provisions of California *Education Code (EC)* include requiring local educational agencies (LEAs) and the California Department of Education (CDE) to include and post requirements for new content and procedures in the Comprehensive School Safety Plans (CSSPs), which have been implemented.

The law requires the California Department of Education (CDE) to develop and post on its website best practices for reviewing and approving school safety plans. In 2020–21 the CDE implemented a statewide survey of local educational agencies (LEAs), school safety administrators, and stakeholders to gather information on current practices, challenges, and resources to assist in developing this content. The state and federal guidance and resources below are provided to assist LEAs in reviewing and approving Comprehensive School Safety Plans (CSSPs). Guidance includes recommendations from the California State Auditor (CSA) Report 2016-136 School Violence Prevention. The CSA Report 2016-136 School Violence Prevention can be found on the CSA's web page.

Background

The California Constitution guarantees California children the right to attend public schools that are safe, secure, and peaceful. The CDE, public school districts, county offices of education (COEs), and schools and their personnel are responsible for creating learning environments that are safe and secure. First responders, community partners, and families play an essential role, as well. Schools must be prepared to respond to emergencies including natural and man-made hazards and strive to prevent violence and behavior issues that undermine safety and security. CSSPs include strategies aimed at the prevention of, and education about, potential incidents involving crime and violence on the school campus and aspects of social, emotional, and physical safety for both youth and adults.

California Education Code Sections 32280–32289.5: Comprehensive School Safety Plans

California *Education Code (EC)* Section 32281(a) requires every kindergarten through grade twelve school, public and public charter, including community and court schools, to develop and maintain a CSSP designed to address campus risks, prepare for emergencies, and create a safe, secure learning environment for students and school

personnel. In a school district with fewer than 2,501 units of average daily attendance, there may be one CSSP for all schools within the district.

The law requires designated stakeholders to annually engage in a systematic planning process to develop strategies and policies to prevent and respond to potential incidents involving emergencies, natural and other disasters, hate crimes, violence, active assailants/intruders, bullying and cyberbullying, discrimination and harassment, child abuse and neglect, discipline, suspension and expulsion, and other safety aspects.

Schools, districts, and COEs all play a role in effective school safety planning and are responsible for familiarity with, and fulfillment of, applicable requirements of EC sections 32280-32289.5.

Timeline for the Comprehensive School Safety Plan

The law requires that each school update and adopt its CSSP by March 1 annually. It requires that the school district or COE approve CSSPs. *EC* does not specify a date by which the safety plan must be approved by the district; however, the school district or COE must annually notify the CDE by October 15 of any school(s) that have not complied with requirements.

Effective school safety planning must be a dynamic, ongoing process with plans being reviewed and evaluated regularly, and after critical incidents.

For full section from CDE website, go to:

[Comprehensive School Safety Plans - Violence Prevention \(CA Dept of Education\)](https://www.cde.ca.gov/ls/ss/vp/cssp.asp)
<https://www.cde.ca.gov/ls/ss/vp/cssp.asp>

Appendix C



Orange County Sheriff's Department School Resource Officer Program Active Shooter Tabletop Exercise

Situation Manual

Date: Tuesday, December 6, 2022

This Situation Manual (SitMan) provides exercise participants with all the necessary tools for their roles in the exercise. Some exercise material is intended for the exclusive use of exercise planners, facilitators, and evaluators, but players may view other materials that are necessary to their performance. All exercise participants may view the SitMan.

1
For Exercise Use Only

EXERCISE AGENDA

Time	Activity
1300 – 1310	Welcome and Participant Briefing
1310 – 1335	Module One: Preparedness
1335 – 1400	Module Two: Incident Response
1400 – 1425	Module Three: Re-Unification
1425 – 1430	De-Brief
1430	Exercise End
*All times are approximate	

EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Exercise Name	School Active Shooter Tabletop Exercise
Exercise Date	Tuesday, December 6, 2022; 1300-1430
Scope	This one and a half hour facilitated exercise will feature discussion on the preparedness, coordination, and response of Law Enforcement resources in the response to an Active Shooter Incident.
Mission Area(s)	Prevention, Protection, and Response
Core Capabilities	• Screening, Search, and Detection • Operational Coordination • Interdiction and Disruption
Objectives	1. Discuss current plans, policies and procedures for the potential mitigation of an active shooter in a school environment. 2. Evaluate plans to evacuate all affected areas, including notification of any evacuation, traffic control, security, student accountability, and operational coordination. 3. Discuss anticipated response from law enforcement and required communication between response agencies, schools, and the public.
Threat or Hazard	Active Shooter
Scenario	The scenario focuses on an active shooter affecting areas in southeastern Orange County. The scenario consists of three modules: Incident notification and initial response, incident expansion, and investigation.
Sponsor	• Orange County Sheriff's Department School Resource Officer Program

GENERAL INFORMATION

Participant Roles and Responsibilities

The term *participant* encompasses many groups of people. Groups of participants involved in the exercise, and their respective roles and responsibilities, are described below:

- **Players.** Players are personnel who have an active role in discussing or performing their regular roles and responsibilities during the exercise. Players discuss or initiate actions in response to the exercise scenario.
- **Observers.** Observers do not directly participate in the exercise. They may support the development of player responses to the situation during the discussion by providing subject matter expertise and asking relevant questions.
- **Facilitators.** Facilitators provide situation updates and moderate discussions. They keep the discussions focused on the objectives, prevent distractions, and keep the exercise on schedule. Facilitators may also provide additional information or resolve questions as required. Key Exercise Planning Team members also may assist with facilitation as subject matter experts (SMEs) during the exercise.

Exercise Structure

This exercise will be a discussion-based, facilitated exercise. Players will participate in the following modules:

- Module One: Preparedness
- Module Two: Incident Response
- Module Three: Re-Unification

Each module begins with a summary of key events. After the updates, participants will review the situation and engage in discussions of appropriate response issues.

Exercise Guidelines

- The scenario and exercise design is a collaboration between all stakeholders.
- This exercise will be held in an open, low-stress, no-fault environment. Participants should expect varying viewpoints, even disagreements.
- Respond to the scenario using your knowledge of current plans and capabilities and insights derived from your understanding of plans, policies, and procedures.
- Decisions are not precedent setting and may not reflect your organization's final position on a given issue. This exercise is an opportunity to discuss and present multiple options and possible solutions.
- Issue identification is not as valuable as suggestions and recommendations that could improve response and recovery efforts. Exercise participants will benefit most when they focus on problem solving efforts.

Exercise Assumptions and Artificialities

In any exercise, assumptions and artificialities will be necessary to complete play in the time allotted. Although everyone may not agree with exactly how the scenario is presented, they will benefit most when they leverage the scenario as the driver to stimulate their discussions and inputs. During this exercise, the following apply:

- The scenario for this exercise is artificial.
- The exercise is conducted in a no-fault learning environment wherein capabilities, plans, systems, and processes will be evaluated (not the participants).
- The exercise scenario is plausible.
- There are neither “hidden agendas” nor any “trick questions.”
- All players receive information at the same time.

Appendix D

Department of Homeland Security School Safety Assessment Checklist

The survey includes the following seven primary topic areas:

(1) Security – Emergency Management: *Security management refers to the people, plans, and procedures that a K-12 school has in place to deal with security issues, including but not limited to active-shooter issues. Factors that contribute to the effectiveness of security and emergency management efforts at schools include the designation of a security manager; existence of security and emergency operations plans; commitment to training and exercises on these plans; procedures for handling suspicious objects; and engaging in preparedness and security working groups with external partners. Schools may use different names for a security plan or incorporate elements of a security plan into broader emergency operations plans, which outline the school's approach to operations before, during, and after an emergency. Understanding which activities occur at an individual school level and which activities occur at the school district level are important considerations for K-12 school personnel to factor into their security and emergency management practices.*

(2) Security Force: *A security force is a group of school employees or contractors whose sole responsibilities are to provide security at a school. A security force does not include general school personnel who are trained in security awareness (i.e., observe and report) in addition to their regular duties. Security forces at schools may include school resource officers (SROs), who are sworn law enforcement officers responsible for safety and crime prevention in schools. A local police department, sheriff's agency, or school system typically employs SROs who work closely with school administrators in an effort to create a safer environment. The responsibilities of SROs are similar to regular police officers in that they have the ability to make arrests, respond to calls for service, and document incidents that occur within their jurisdiction. Some schools may have a dedicated SRO who is assigned full-time to an individual school. Other schools may have SROs who balance responsibilities at multiple schools within a district. Other models may involve full- or part-time private security personnel serving in security force roles, or school officials serving in multiple roles that include but are not limited to security. In this section, a school is considered to have security force only if it has people whose sole responsibilities are to provide security.*

(3) Entry Control: *Controlling how and when faculty, staff, students, and visitors can access school buildings and grounds is considered an effective mechanism for protecting against different threats, including active shooters. These controls can include minimizing the number of points of entry, requiring identification, or conducting searches. However, these entry controls may sometimes run counter to the overarching objective of creating an open learning environment at K-12*

schools. Entry controls are part of the broader layers of defense that schools have in place to enhance security. These layers of protective measures are deployed in concentric circles around a school, starting at the outer perimeter and moving inward to areas with the greatest need for protection. Entry controls can help deter individuals from initiating violent attacks, detect attacks earlier at a safe distance, and delay attackers from reaching vulnerable and/or highly populated locations.

4) Fencing and Gates: Fences are barriers enclosing or bordering a school that are used to prevent entrance, contain people to particular areas, or mark a boundary. Gates are openings in that perimeter that allow people or vehicles to pass through at controlled points of entry. Together, fences and gates are part of the broader layers of defense that schools have in place to protect against a spectrum of security issues, including but not limited to active shooters. These layers of protective measures are deployed in concentric circles around a school, starting at the outer perimeter and moving inward to areas with the greatest need for protection. Often fences are installed at a school for the purpose of protecting people and property from harm or damage from playground or sports items. These sections of fence may serve dual purposes of security and protection. However, when looking at fence lines, school officials should consider all sections of the fence, not just the tallest, newest, or what appears to be most secure. Areas where a person could easily penetrate the fence line and access the property are also important to evaluate. Fences and gates may deter or delay active-shooter intrusion. Fence construction may include different materials (e.g., chain link, wood, wrought iron, plastic), heights, anchoring, and other features (e.g., barbed wire along the top, privacy screening, outriggers). Similarly, gates can apply to vehicles and pedestrians and may include moveable bollards, roller or slide gates, swing gates, or turnstiles, among other construction options. It is understood that use of fences or gates is simply not practical in many locations. In that case, the building envelope, in particular windows and doors and the entry control process are the primary elements to deter or delay.

(5) Parking and Barriers: Parking and barriers are part of the broader layers of defense that schools have in place to enhance security. These security measures may be considered more relevant to explosive threats (i.e., where standoff distance is important) or vehicle ramming threats (i.e., where high-speed avenues of approach are a concern). However, parking controls and barriers can also help deter individuals from initiating armed attacks; detect these attacks earlier at a safe distance; and delay attackers from reaching vulnerable and/or highly populated locations on school grounds. Monitoring parking areas for suspicious or illegal vehicle placement can include viewing the parking area via security cameras, requiring onsite security personnel to conduct patrols, or maintaining incidental visual contact through windows. Vehicle screening processes may also uncover weapons that individuals plan to use in active-shooter attacks.

(6) Building Envelope: Building envelope is the exterior face of a school building, including walls, roof, windows, and doors. The building envelope provides a significant layer of defense but also includes notable vulnerabilities (i.e., doors, windows) that are important to consider for physical security. Construction materials for doors and windows in particular influence the effectiveness of these features in deterring, delaying, or denying active-shooter attacks. For doors, options include metal- or wood-framed glass; solid- or hollow-core wood; fire-rated steel or aluminum; hollow steel; metal clad; or blast-resistant. Windows may include tempered glass; wire-reinforced glass; laminated glass; bullet-proof glass; and blast-resistant safety films. Access to utilities and fire alarms are important physical security considerations in active-shooter situations because attackers can coopt these features to create diversions or complicate response efforts. Portable buildings that are used for classrooms often add unique challenges. Portable buildings or temporary structures used for classrooms often do not have the same construction features as the primary building. Thus, windows and doors will not have the same level of security. Often the portable buildings are located in unsecured areas that provide easy access to an attacker. If a school has portable buildings and eliminating their use is not practical, additional security measures are often necessary, including increased monitoring, assigned security personnel, retrofitting doors and locks, or ballistic protection on the windows. Securing these school building features as part of steady-state efforts may deter attackers from attempting to exploit them.

7) CCV – VSS: CCV and video surveillance systems (VSS) are electronic systems of cameras, control equipment, recorders, and related apparatus used for surveillance or alarm assessment. These systems can help deter individuals from initiating armed attacks and detect these attacks earlier at a safe distance. CCV/VSS technology options include a range of technologies (i.e., digital or analog, fiber or wireless transmission) and features (i.e., color or black-and-white video, adjustable side-to-side or up-and-down movement of cameras, wide-angle or zoom views). They also can include software that helps identify anomalies and ultimately the ability of users to identify suspicious behaviors. Schools may have dedicated security staff who monitor these systems in real time, or they may only view recorded information in response to specific incidents or inquiries. Following an incident, CCV/VSS data can provide valuable forensic information that first responders can use in response efforts and follow-on investigations. Surveillance cameras can be used to monitor common areas that are not within the normal view of teachers, administrators, or security personnel. Video surveillance can also streamline access control procedures, allowing administrative or security personnel to monitor and control locked entrances remotely when used with intercoms and remote control door locks, if practical.

Access to full school survey:

School Security Assessment Tool (SSAT) | CISA (<https://www.cisa.gov/school-security-assessment-tool>)

Appendix E

2022-2023 Orange County Grand Jury School Safety Questionnaire For Public Schools

Mailing Address: OC Grand Jury, 700 W Civic Center Dr, Santa Ana, CA 92701

e-mail Address: grandjurysupport@occourts.org

***Admonition:** This correspondence and your response to it are strictly confidential. This confidential document may only be discussed with those individuals responsible for or needed to answer the survey questions. This means that the contents of this survey and your answers are not to be released to the public or shared with anyone not directly involved in responding without the prior written authorization of the Orange County Superior Court or Orange County Grand Jury. The Grand Jury assures you that it will maintain the confidentiality of site-specific information provided in each response, will not publicly disclose anything that could lead to the identity of any respondents, and thanks you in advance for your cooperation.*

School District: _____
 Public School: _____
 Grade Levels: _____ Enrollment: _____
 Respondent's Name and Title: _____
 Phone Number: _____ e-mail: _____
 Response Date: _____

Note: If more room is required to provide the requested information, you may include an additional document numbered to indicate the question.

1. Does your school have a Comprehensive School Safety Plan (CSSP)?	☐ Yes ☐ No (also select 'Other' and explain) ☐ Other (please explain): _____
2. How often is the CSSP updated and approved?	☐ Annual ☐ Other (please explain) _____
3. Does your school perform a Safety Assessment as part of the CSSP development process?	☐ Yes ☐ Other (please explain) _____
4. Does your school have a written policy (or policies) and/or procedure(s) regarding visitor access to your school campus during school hours?	☐ Yes ☐ District Policy Only ☐ No

Please submit your CSSP, Safety Assessment, and all School Safety policies and procedures to the Grand Jury, preferably electronically to the e-mail address: grandjurysupport@occourts.org near the top of this page, including policies and procedures that address approved visitor lists, visitor rules and protocols, intruders or unauthorized persons and response protocols, active shooter protocols, lockdowns, evacuations, student release and other related topics.

5. Who is responsible for campus access policy development, periodic reviews, approval, and/or training? (Check all that apply)	☐ Principal ☐ Additional School Administrators ☐ District Superintendent ☐ District Administrators and/or Staff ☐ School Board ☐ Crisis Team Leaders ☐ School Site Council ☐ Local Law Enforcement ☐ Outside Consultants ☐ Other (please list) _____ _____
6. A printed or electronic copy of the campus access policy is distributed to: (Check all that apply)	☐ District Administrators ☐ School Administrators ☐ Teachers ☐ Substitute Teachers ☐ Support Staff ☐ Maintenance Staff ☐ Parents ☐ Students ☐ School Volunteers ☐ Law Enforcement ☐ Other (please list) _____ _____
7. The campus access policy is available in the following languages: (Check all that apply)	☐ English ☐ Spanish ☐ Vietnamese ☐ Korean ☐ Other (please list) _____
8. What funding sources has your school utilized to finance school safety improvements?	☐ Bond Issue(s) ☐ Federal Funds/Grants ☐ State Funds/Grants ☐ Fundraisers ☐ Philanthropic Entities/Donations ☐ Other _____

9. What are the attributes of the fence installed around your school? (Check all that apply)	☐ Ten feet and higher ☐ Eight to ten feet ☐ Six to eight feet ☐ Less than six feet ☐ Single point of entry ☐ Multiple points of entry with locking gates ☐ Multiple points of entry (no gates) ☐ No fence
10. Who receives training regarding visitor/ intruder access to your campus? (Check all that apply)	☐ District Administrators ☐ School Administrators ☐ Teachers ☐ Substitute Teachers ☐ Support Staff ☐ Maintenance Staff ☐ Parents ☐ Students ☐ School Volunteers ☐ Other (please list) _____
11. How often is intruder response training provided? (Check all that apply)	☐ Periodically ☐ Annually ☐ Start of Semester/Semi-annually ☐ Start of Quarter/Quarterly ☐ Monthly ☐ New Hire/Staff Transfers (including Teachers) ☐ Other (please explain) _____
12. Does your campus conduct active drills for intruders?	☐ Yes – Only campus personnel ☐ Yes – Campus personnel and students ☐ Yes – Campus personnel and law enforcement ☐ Yes – Campus personnel, students, and law enforcement ☐ No
13. Is there a system in place to alert the entire campus about the presence of intruders?	☐ Yes ☐ No – Only partial (please explain): _____ ☐ No (please explain) _____
14. Are intruder incident reports prepared and filed with law enforcement?	☐ Yes ☐ No
15. Are intruder logs submitted periodically to the school district?	☐ Yes ☐ No

16. Are intruder events shared with other schools in Orange County?	☐ Yes ☐ No
17. Are intruder events shared with other schools in the state?	☐ Yes ☐ No
18. Can classroom doors be locked from inside the classroom?	☐ Yes ☐ No
19. Can office, gymnasium, auditorium, and cafeteria doors be locked from inside?	☐ Yes ☐ Some (please list _____) ☐ No
20. Can classrooms be locked from a central location, such as the main office?	☐ Yes ☐ No
21. Is there video surveillance of the campus?	☐ Yes (check all that apply) ☐ Exteriors ☐ Offices ☐ Hallways ☐ Classrooms ☐ Auditorium/Theatre ☐ Gymnasium ☐ Cafeteria ☐ Other (please list) _____ ☐ No
22. How does staff distinguish between students and non-students of similar age?	Please explain: _____ _____ _____
23. Whom does your school allow onto campus other than students and staff during the school day? (Check all that apply)	☐ Parent/Guardian/Family of Student ☐ School Volunteers ☐ Vendors ☐ Contractors ☐ Delivery Personnel ☐ Family of Staff ☐ Other (please list) _____
24. Does your campus utilize Raptor or another identity verification system for visitors?	☐ Yes, Raptor (Skip to 28) ☐ Other (please list) _____ ☐ No
25. Are visitors required to show picture identification and sign in at the main office?	☐ Yes ☐ No

26. What information is included on temporary visitor badges? (Check all that apply)	☐ Name ☐ Date ☐ Destination on campus ☐ Other (please list _____)
27. Are logs maintained of all visitors to your campus?	☐ Yes ☐ No
28. Who is required to wear a visible temporary visitor's badge? (Check all that apply)	☐ Parent/Guardian/Family of Student ☐ School Volunteers ☐ Vendors ☐ Contractors ☐ Delivery Personnel ☐ Family of Staff ☐ Other (please list _____)
29. Are visitors required to sign out and surrender temporary visitor badges when leaving the campus?	☐ Yes, always ☐ Yes, sometimes (please explain) _____ ☐ No (please explain) _____
30. Who is required to wear a photo identification badge while on campus during the school day? (Check all that apply)	☐ District Administrators ☐ School Administrators ☐ Teachers ☐ Substitute Teachers ☐ Support Staff ☐ Maintenance ☐ Parents ☐ Students ☐ School Volunteers ☐ Other (please list) _____
31. Does your school allow any visitors onto campus without signing in during the school day?	☐ No ☐ Yes (please explain) _____ _____
32. If a visitor accesses the campus without checking in, how is the visitor located, tracked, and identified?	Please explain: _____ _____ _____
33. Who is equipped with two-way communication devices? (Check all that apply)	☐ School Administrators ☐ School Staff ☐ Teachers ☐ Substitute Teachers ☐ Maintenance Staff ☐ Coaches ☐ Other _____

34. Is there a policy in place to alert the office staff about school employees or family members of students with active restraining orders?	☐ Yes ☐ No (please explain) _____ _____
35. Is there a procedure in place that encourages the reporting of weaknesses or failures in any campus security systems?	☐ Yes ☐ No
36. What are your biggest concerns regarding your ability to secure your school campus from outside intrusion?	Please explain: _____ _____ _____
37. Does your school have a Wellness Program on campus to identify students who may be in crisis and provide behavioral and mental health support to prevent the crisis from becoming violent?	☐ No ☐ Yes (please describe): _____ _____ _____ _____
38. If your school was granted additional funding for security, how would the school use it?	Please explain: _____ _____
39. Are there any other security measures in place at your school that were not revealed in prior questions and answers?	☐ Yes (please explain): _____ _____ _____ ☐ No
40. Is there anything else about your school's security that you wish the Grand Jury to know?	☐ Yes (please explain): _____ _____ _____ ☐ No
41. Please provide the names and contact information of anyone else to whom the Grand Jury may reach out to, other than those identified in Question 2, should it have additional or follow-up questions:	Please list: _____ _____ _____ _____ _____